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On Overinvoicing of Exports in Pakistan 
 
ZAFAR MAHMOOD and MOHAMMAD AZHAR 
 
Whereas the policy incentives were designed to promote exports from Pakistan, the 
incentive system instead led to illicit export practices, i.e., export overinvoicing due to the 
weaknesses of implementation. Such practices resulted in a significant financial loss to the 
country and undermined the effectiveness of the export-promoting policy. This paper has 
determined the presence of overinvoicing of exports in Pakistan and the geographic and 
product-wise patterns in export overinvoicing. The paper has applied the ‘partner-country 
data comparison’ technique. Empirical findings confirm the strong presence of export 
overinvoicing across trading partner countries and products. This conclusion is further 
supported by the evidence of a significant difference between the duty-drawback rate and 
the premium on foreign exchange in the kerb market. Convincing presence of export 
overinvoicing is the basis for a set of policy recommendations made in the paper. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan launched its programme of industrialisation under the influence of 
import-substituting (IS) strategy of advancing development.  The IS strategy, pursued 
for many decades, however, has not satisfied the goals of the industrial policy. 
Dissatisfaction with the outcome of IS policies has lead to a partial shift from the IS 
strategy to the export-promoting (EP) strategy.  
In the process of this strategic shift, Pakistan has offered many attractive 
incentives to encourage the production of export-oriented manufactured products. 
Whereas export incentives have helped the country to manage a respectable growth 
rate in exports, exporters have exploited the weaknesses of the incentive system and 
developed some unfair export practices (by overinvoicing the value of transaction). 
These illicit practices result in a significant financial loss to the country and 
undermine the effectiveness of the policies to achieve their stated goals.   At the same 
time, many exporters who do not indulge in such practices have to suffer losses, as 
their bargaining position in the marketplace is affected adversely. 
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The menace of overinvoicing of exports calls for immediate attention of 
policy-makers, because without recognising it they may limit the scope of the export-
promoting schemes and the trade liberalisation programme. Ideally, the implications 
of export overinvoicing should be integrated with the usual policy prescriptions. 
Likewise, it is important to determine the presence and magnitude of export 
overinvoicing, so that policy-makers are reminded of the extent of the problem. 
Despite this well-recognised problem in Pakistan, no systematic study is 
available on the subject. To fill this gap, this paper shows its presence and estimates 
the geographic and product-wise patterns in export overinvoicing. The paper 
concludes on a set of policy recommendations to curb the menace of export 
overinvoicing. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains reasons for 
overinvoicing of exports, while Section 3 describes export overinvoicing and 
quantifying through the empirical approach. Export-promoting policies adopted 
during the period of the study are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, empirical 
findings are reported. Finally, Section 6 gives policy suggestions. 
 
2.  EXPLAINING THE OVERINVOICING OF EXPORTS 
Why exporters indulge in unethical and unfair trade practices?  An exporter is 
tempted to overinvoice exports1 if (say) the duty drawback2 rate is higher than the 
premium on foreign currency that he has to purchase from the kerb market to meet 
the export-earning surrender requirement of the State Bank. When there are no 
foreign exchange controls, so that all exchange transactions take place only within an 
insignificant range legally permitted around the parity value, i.e., the premium is nil, 
then there is a clear incentive to overinvoice exports in the presence of a scheme of 
duty drawback. Where, however, there is exchange control, and the exporter must 
surrender all declared export receipts to the State Bank, the exporter will have to 
purchase illegal foreign exchange in the kerb market to an amount excess of the 
declared over actual value of exports. In this case, if the kerb market premium on 
foreign exchange is less than the rate of duty drawback, then again the exporter will 
be induced to overinvoice exports. There is, however, some risk (of being caught by 
law enforcement agencies) attached to getting involve in illegal activities. Hence, 
overinvoicing of exports will not cease unless the differential between the duty 
drawback and the premium in the kerb exchange market is greater than the risk 
factor evaluated by the exporter.  
 
1Major instruments used for export overinvoicing include: misdeclaration of quantity, 
misdeclaration of value, misdeclaration of blend ratios, and presentation of forged bank credit advice. 
2Export incentives that are misused to overinvoice exports are: duty drawbacks, concessional 
export finance, and income tax rebate. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
Under normal circumstances, one would expect a trading partner country’s 
statistics to show excess of carriage and freight (c & f) import values over the 
corresponding free on board (f.o.b.) export values of the same trade commodity. But 
if the observed discrepancy is in the reverse direction, and there is no other reason 
for the discrepancy, one may conclude the presence of overinvoicing of exports. This 
inference will be more certain if it can be established (i) that for these commodities 
the duty drawback rates are higher than the kerb market premium rate on foreign 
exchange and (ii) that these commodities are such that it is relatively easy to 
overinvoice them because of the nature of the products. 
Following Bhagwati (1964, 1967); Mahmood (1997); Mahmood and Nazli 
(1999); Naya and Morgan (1969) and Simkin (1970), we use the partner-country-
data comparison technique to test for overinvoicing of exports. In this technique, 
cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) import value of the partner country are compared 
with the free on board (f.o.b.) export value of the concerned country to find 
unexpected discrepancies in exports. Using this approach, export overinvoicing is 
defined in the following way: 
MIS = MIC – XP*AD 
Where, 
 MIS = Misinvoicing of exports. 
 MIC = C.i.f. imports of industrial countries from Pakistan. 
 XP  = F.o.b. exports of Pakistan to industrial countries. 
 AD = Adjustment factor defined as c.i.f.-f.o.b. ratio. 
 MIS < 0, implies overinvoicing of exports. 
To show such discrepancies, we use data available in the ‘Commodity Trade 
Statistics’ of the United Nations and ‘Direction of Trade Statistics’ of the 
International Monetary Fund. The data for c.i.f.-f.o.b. adjustment factor are obtained 
from International Monetary Fund (1984, 1992, 1994). 
One should also note the following alternative reasons3 that can be put 
forward to explain the unusual discrepancies: 
 1. The method presumes the faking of invoices to occur only in one country. If 
both countries fake invoices, it becomes impossible to make a case for 
overinvoicing of exports. One-sided fake invoicing can, however, be 
assumed given strict enforcement of regulations in the partner countries, 
especially the developed ones. 
 2. There can be ‘mis-allocations’ of the same traded item by commodity and 
country. These inconsistencies can arise from both genuine customs mistakes 
and differences in classifications adopted by trading partners. Cross-checking 
 
3See Bhagwati (1964, 1974) for a detailed discussion of these reasons. 
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of commodities by countries enables one to determine a possible explanation 
of unusual discrepancies. 
 
4.  EXPORT-PROMOTING POLICIES 
Realising the distortionary effects of the import-substitution policies, Pakistan 
has pursued export-promoting policies since the late 1950s. One of the prominent 
tools of this policy adopted in 1959 was the export bonus scheme, which introduced 
multiple exchange rates in the country.4 This scheme was abandoned in 1972 after 
the devaluation of Pak rupee. In order to promote export of manufactured goods, 
since the late 1970s, an elaborate export incentive system was introduced. This 
system included: (i) exemption of exports from sales tax and central excise duty, (ii) 
duty drawback scheme covering sales tax, central excise duty, and customs duty on 
inputs used in the production of exports, (iii) taxation of export of domestically 
produced raw materials, (iv) concessionary export finance and export credit 
guarantee scheme, and (v) income tax rebates. 
Out of the above list of incentives, three measures induce exporters to indulge 
in export overinvoicing: concessionary export finance, duty drawback on exports, 
and income tax rebate on profits from exports. Concessionary export finance 
provides short-term pre-shipment and post-shipment finance in local currency to 
direct exporters. Limited availability of concessional export finance induces 
exporters to overinvoice the value of exports so that they can obtain a large size of 
loan from the bank. In 1994, the annual interest rate on concessional loans was 11 
percent, with a maximum loan period of 180 days.5 In contrast to this, the market 
interest rate was 22-23 percent. About 70 percent of exports fell within the 
concessionary export credit scheme. In 1993, US$ 2.7 billion of export credits were 
extended to exporters. Export refinance borrowings are either exempted from the 
payment of excise duty or taxes are included in the export rebates. 
Pakistan allows drawback on customs duties and sales taxes on imported 
inputs, and on excise duties and sales taxes on indigenous inputs. Rebates for 54 
broad industrial groups covering more than 250 products have been standardised as a 
specified percentage of the f.o.b. value of export or a specific amount per unit of 
goods exported. The customs duty drawback rate, as a percent of manufactured 
exports on which duty drawback is applied, was 12.5 percent in 1994.6 The gap 
 
4For a detailed discussion of the export bonus scheme, see Naqvi (1966). 
5The interest rate on concessionary export credit has been increased over time. Export finance was 
available at only 3 percent interest rate up to 1986. It was raised to 6 percent in 1987. The interest rate was 
further increased to 7 percent in 1991, to 8 percent in 1992, and to 11 percent in 1994. Later, it was 
lowered to 9 percent but again raised in 2001 to 10.5 percent. 
6To this rate of duty drawback, one can add the effect of higher concessional export finance 
obtained through export overinvoicing, and that of rebate earned on account of income tax. Obviously, the 
effective benefit earned through export overinvoicing on account of all these leakages will be much higher 
than 12.5 percent. Non-availability of the required data keep us from estimating the total effective rate of 
this benefit. 
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between the duty drawback rate and the exchange rate premium attracts exporters to 
indulge in overinvoicing exports. This is mainly due to the fact that with little effort, 
corrupt exporters with the connivance of corrupt government and bank officials 
manage to receive drawbacks from the exchequer. They, in fact, exploit the 
weaknesses of the duty drawback system (DDS) while indulging in unfair trade 
practices. The major weaknesses of the DDS are as follows: 
 1. Duty drawback rates are not automatically adjusted to take account of 
additional taxes imposed by the government from time to time. 
 2. Due to fixed nature of the system, exporters in general are unable to draw 
back the full amount of taxes and duties paid by them. 
 3. The Revenue Division sometimes confronts exporters with an arbitrary 
downward revision in export prices without any prior notification. 
Up to 1988, the government allowed income tax rebate at the rate of 55 
percent of the profits earned through exports of manufactured goods. In 1989, the 
government introduced a three-tier system, in which the income tax rebate was 
graduated with the degree of processing. On semi-manufactured goods, such as 
cotton yarn, the income tax rebate was 25 percent. On manufactured exports, in 
general, it was 50 percent. But on the exports of some manufactured goods, viz., 
leather garments, engineering and electrical goods, the rebate was 75 percent. In 
1993, exports of furniture, doors, and windows were also allowed 75 percent income 
tax rebate. Later on, the income tax rebate rate was increased to 90 percent in the 
case of all goods receiving a rebate of 75 percent. Thus by showing large export 
value out of their total domestic production, exporting firms earn a large income tax 
rebate. 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Alternative explanations of unusual discrepancies in exports, described in 
Section 2, show the practical difficulties which one faces when drawing conclusions 
about overinvoicing of exports. Nonetheless, this paper shows that there is enough 
evidence to provide an explanation for overinvoicing of exports in Pakistan. A 
comparison of the official exchange rate and the kerb market exchange rate suggests 
that exporters lose by paying about 4.5 percent more in the kerb market to buy 
foreign exchange in order to make payments to the State Bank but gain in terms of 
duty drawbacks by about 12.5 percent by overinvoicing exports.7 
The analysis begins by establishing that if overinvoicing of exports takes 
place at the aggregate level, then it can unambiguously be established at the refined 
 
7The current kerb-market premium is about 4.5 percent. It came down from 22 percent in 1981, 
when the country had a fixed exchange rate system, to 8.7 in 1988, when a managed floating exchange 
rate was in force [Mahmood (1997)]. Now, with the introduction of inter-bank exchange market, the kerb-
market exchange rate has further come down. Thus cost of overinvoicing has gone down over this time. 
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level of Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), such as at three-digit or 
four-digit levels. For the aggregate level, Table 1 reveals that exporters overinvoiced 
exports to the tune of US$ 2.4 billion over the period 1984 to 1994, i.e., on average 
US$ 240 million per annum. This amount is equivalent to about 28 percent of the 
total export value of any recent year in Pakistan. 
The above estimates of export overinvoicing are further confirmed from 
unpublished estimates of the Revenue Division on amounts deducted as over-
claimed for duty drawbacks (see Table 2). On the basis of the current level of duty 
drawback claims made by exporters and the scrutiny made by the Collectorate staff, 
the potential revenue loss prevented in Karachi was US$ 29.3 million, or 25 percent 
of the total claims filed during the year 1997-98. The Karachi Collectorate accounts 
for about 50 percent of  the nationwide  rebate claims but represents about 80 percent  
 
Table 1 
Export Misinvoicing in Pakistan 
(Million US Dollars) 
Year MIC XP AD MIS 
1984 1210 1199 1.095 –102.91 
1985 1529 1376 1.095 22.28 
1986 1965 1888 1.095 –102.36 
1987 2487 2510 1.095 –261.45 
1988 2789 2690 1.095 –161.93 
1989 2849 2736 1.095 –146.92 
1990 3441 3400 1.095 –291.00 
1991 3724 3637 1.095 –257.52 
1992 3959 4001 1.095 –421.10 
1993 3960 3933 1.095 –346.63 
1994 4504 4448 1.095 –366.56 
Note:   (–) Value means overinvoicing of exports. 
 
Table 2 
Drawback Claims: Karachi Export Collectorate (1997-98) 
(Million US Dollars) 




























  96.2 
  16.4 
          102,628 116.85 87.59 –29.26   75.0 
Source: Revenue Division (1999, unpublished). 
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of the high-risk exports. Interestingly, whereas these figures confirm the presence of 
export overinvoicing by the official source, the low size of fake invoicing shown by 
these figures confirms weak enforcement of the law by the Revenue Division. 
Aggregate estimates of export overinvoicing are subject to two limitations: (i) 
they only portray the aggregate picture and hence hide many facts regarding 
geographic and product-wise patterns in export overinvoicing, and (ii) they are net of 
export underinvoicing and hence under-report the actual size of export 
overinvoicing. Because of these limitations, we provide below estimates of export 
overinvoicing with a focus on geographic and product-wise patterns. 
For the sake of analysis, we consider only those products which are generally 
overinvoiced and have a major stake in exports; namely, leather garments (SITC-
612), cotton cloth (SITC-652), man-made woven fabrics (SITC-653), made-up 
textiles (SITC-658), linen (SITC-6584), women’s garments non-knit (SITC-843), 
undergarments knitted (SITC-846), headgear non-textile fabrics (SITC-848), surgical 
goods (SITC-872), and sports goods (SITC-894). These products accounted for 42 
percent of the total exports in 1994. (See Table 3.) 
All of the selected products testify to overinvoicing of exports. The last 
column of Table 4 shows that for three selected years,8 1984, 1992 and 1994, 
overinvoicing of exports is quite visible: US$ 54.82 million in 1984, US$ 413.67 
million in 1992, and US$ 455.78 in 1994. In 1994, the degree of overinvoicing of 
exports was about 7 percent. For all the selected years and for all the selected 
products, exports were overinvoiced, with the exception of made-up textiles in 1984, 
women’s garments non-knit in 1984, and sports goods in 1992. Four major export 
products overinvoiced in 1994 were cotton cloth (US$ 89.8 million); women’s 
garments non-knit (US$ 85.5 million), made-up textiles (US$ 85.5 million), and 
man-made woven fabrics (US$ 60.0 million). 
 
Table 3 
Exports by Commodity Prone to Overinvoicing 
(Million US Dollars) 
                       Year 
Commodity 1984 1992 1994 
Textiles 395.97 950.18 1080.81 
Garments 191.87 773.71 847.52 
Surgical Goods 41.16 70.44 71.65 
Sports Goods 45.81 99.46 160.61 
Total Exports 2575.01 4999.40 5167.27 
Source: Economic Survey, 1997-98. 
 
8The year 1984 is selected because this was the year when trade liberalisation began to have its 
initial impact. 1992 is selected because widespread trade liberalisation programmes were initiated in 
Pakistan that year. The year 1994 is selected as the last year for which data are available. 
Table 4 
Size of Overinvoicing of Exports by Major Importing Countries( from Pakistan): Three- and Four-digit Level of SITC 
(Thousand US Dollars) 
                                      Country 
Commodity/Year Japan 
Hong 






pore Canada Total 
Leather Garments (612)               
1992      –2627        –2627 
1994    –871  –2295        –3166 
Cotton Cloth (652)               
1984  529  –1132 –2964 –866 –7680 –9370 –2864     –24347 
1992 –2090 –12345 –9514 –5204 –5495 3656 1167  –3854  –4427  –6525 –44631 
1994 –5038 –10042 –22264 –3486 –3886 –8044 13689 –22684 –2861 –5371 –3903 –11306 –4609 –89805 
Man-made Woven Fabrics (653)               
1984        –935      –935 
1992   –11020 1623 10450 –21352 –16186  –3327  –6929  –2966 –49707 
1994  –3291 –12642 43 8753 –26139 –1033 –4712 –4239 –6889 –7373 –2402 –88 –60012 
Made-up Textiles (658)               
1984    –1826  8226 –2309 –2184  –1334 –465   108 
1992 –5226 –2142 –6657 –18405 –7267 –9389 –2541  –2665 –12270 –2222  –4274 –73058 
1994 –2897  –8440 –4873 –4329 –29477 –4011 –7908 –2441 –16553 –1366 –277 –2927 –85499 
Linen (6584)               
1984    –1364  2677 –2100 –2083   –288   –3158 
1992 –3277  –5533 –7897 –6197 8093 –1060  –2201 –10881 –2858  –3401 –35212 
1994 –778  –6506 4780 –3057 –2102 –2675 –10624 –1528 –17661 –935 –236 –1094 –26516 
Women’s Garments Non-knit (843)               
1984    256  10017  731  –25    10978 
1992    –14410 –2870 –62507 –9039   –5215   –6357 –100398





Undergarments Knitted (846)               
1984    –232  –1695 –666 –568  219    –2942 
1992    –9440  –26740 –1558   –4187    –41925 
1994   –2890 –10841 –640 –20732 –4223 –1722  –4031 –287 767 –2475 –47073 
Headgear Nontextile Fabric (848)               
1984    –3248 –199 –697 67 129  –352    –4300 
1992 –280  –2402 –3683 –1537 –32201 –4534   –3825 2146  –1888 –48205 
1994 284 –3325 –997 –2360 1101 3083 2174 2308 –227 –3069 2042  –667 347 
Surgical Goods (872)               
1984    –3367  –2862  –11592      –17821 
1992    –1789 –432 –20245 –1354       –23820 
1994 –1102   –811 –341 –20359 –1107 –2621 –780 –2355    –29474 
Sports Goods (894)               
1984    –540 –440 –433 1240 –12231      –12404 
1992 1405  –1268 –495 –103 3504 4254  –994 –689 300   5914 
1994 2618 –717 –3995 –8653 –1618 –7161 2724 –7285 –953 –2735 9 149 –1438 –29055 
Total  
1984 – 529 – –11453 –3603 14367 –11448 –38103 –2864 –1492 –753 – – –54820 
1992 –9468 –14487 –36394 –59700 –13451 –159808 –30851 – –13041 –37067 –13990 – –25411 –413669
1994 –6913 –17375 –59676 –41084 –3551 –166157 2869 –62100 –13029 –61717 –11526 –13305 –17833 –455781
Note: Despite our best efforts, data for the U.K. for the year 1992 could not be obtained. 
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Thirteen major importers of selected products included in the analysis are: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Singapore, UK, and USA. Collectively, these countries 
accounted for 62.4 percent of the total exports in 1994. Overinvoicing of exports in 
every product is taking place with every major trading partner of Pakistan (see Table 
4). Overinvoicing of exports in case of each selected product and for every selected 
year is found for Australia, Belgium, Canada, and Hong Kong. However, for other 
countries, in case of a few products, export overinvoicing was not present in each 
year. For instance, in the case of Japan, overinvoicing was not present in headgear 
non-textile fabrics (in 1984) and in sports goods (in 1992 and 1994). Likewise, one 
can notice such cases for other countries. Despite the absence of overinvoicing of 
exports in a few cases, the overall overinvoicing status remains unchanged. In fact, if 
these cases are excluded from the analysis, the size of overall overinvoicing will go 
up further. 
Finally, in order to confirm that the discrepancies reported above only arise 
because of overinvoicing of exports, offsetting discrepancies were thoroughly 
checked. First, after summing up all countries by individual commodity groups, there 
remain discrepancies. This confirms that there are no ‘mis-allocations’ of the same 
export good by commodity and country. Secondly, by including only those countries 
which have relatively free trade and strict enforcement of regulations, and by using a 
relatively large number of products, a strong attempt has been made to eliminate the 
effects of other factors which may give rise to the discrepancy. Alternative reasons 
for these discrepancies do not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation and lead to 
the conclusion that they are there due to the overinvoicing of exports. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has shown the existence of discrepancies in selected export 
statistics for which the only explanation appears to be overinvoicing. This argument 
can be supported with the evidence of significant differences between the duty 
drawback rate and the premium on the kerb market foreign exchange rate, which 
turned out to be 8 percent. To this effect, if the impact of income tax rebate and 
concessional export finance on account of export overinvoicing is added, then this 
percentage will further rise. These convincing indications of the presence of 
overinvoicing of exports lead us to put forward the following policy 
recommendations:  
 1. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) does not treat duty drawbacks at final 
stages and early stages of export production as “export subsidy”. Therefore, 
the introduction of an efficient duty drawback system will give tariff-free and 
indirect tax-free status to exports, and will be instrumental in curbing export 
overinvoicing. For this development the following measures need to be 
introduced: 
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 (a) Increase inspection and examine all export products subject to specific 
duty drawback rates. 
 (b) Re-adjust promptly all the announced and revised duty drawbacks and 
other policy measures. This is crucial to exporters for negotiating export 
contracts with foreign buyers. Downward revisions of drawback rates 
should be made effective after a sufficient time lag to allow full 
accommodation of import costs based on earlier higher duties and tax 
rates. 
 (c) Adopt a method of determining duty drawbacks based on proper input-
output coefficients, aided by professional engineers and accountants.9 
 (d) Introduce a mechanism to ensure proper recording of export prices of 
rebateable products. This will protect exporters from the occasional 
arbitrary downward adjustments of export prices by the DDS 
administration and prevent the overinvoicing of exports to benefit from 
duty drawback. 
 (e) Introduce export product sample testing to verify blend ratios. Testing 
should be outsourced to well-reputed testing laboratories. 
 (f) All bank credit advice (BCAs) should be channelled through the State 
Bank of Pakistan and be duly authenticated before drawback payments 
are made. This will reduce the risk of forged/fake BCAs which reflect 
higher realisation of export proceeds or submission of altogether fake 
BCAs covering ghost exports. 
 (g) Use the individual drawbacks for major imported inputs used to produce 
each export item, and fixed drawbacks for miscellaneous imported 
inputs.  
 (h) Fully document all the export operations, i.e., processing, exporter 
profiling, export examination, and drawback claim payment at all export 
stations. 
 2. Shift emphasis of Export Finance Scheme from providing preferential 
interest rate loans to a few large direct exporters to an emphasis on providing 
easy access to export finance for all exporting activities at the market 
(competitive) interest rate, on the basis of confirmed export orders. The 
overall amount allocated for the purpose should be raised to accommodate all 
targeted exports. 
 3. Income tax rebates to exporters amount to a subsidy on exports; the WTO 
members may contest these. The Government of Pakistan should review this 
policy. This should enable the government not only to fulfil its general 
obligations to the WTO but also lessen the problem of export overinvoicing. 
 
9The recent announcement of the establishment of Input-Output Coefficient Organisation is a 
right step. The successful experience of East Asian countries in this regard suggests that the work of this 
organisation should enable the Revenue Division to adopt more practical and effective methods to 
determine the value of drawbacks on exports. 
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 4. The Government should take appropriate measures to eliminate the Hundi 
system, which is one of the major sources of finance for exporters who 
overinvoice exports. 
 5. Eliminate redundant tariffs as a first step towards lowering or removing all 
tariffs. The Government should continuously review its tariff schedule. All of 
this should reduce the administrative burden of drawback administration. 
 6. There is a need for a comprehensive policy on customs bilateral pact with our 
major trading partners. The mutual administrative assistance in customs 
matters should aim at sharing intelligence and other trade-related information 
between any two countries to curb fake invoicing. The idea here is to curb 
unhealthy trade practices that are detrimental to growing global integration of 
markets. 
 7. Export contract value should be made the basis of duty drawbacks. If the 
invoice value of the exporter is as per the contract value with the trading 
partner, there will be no need for trade verification. 
 8. The Government should make a greater use of penalties covering ineligibility 
for duty drawbacks to those exporters who indulge in overinvoicing. 
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